中国に遠慮しすぎ、危険増す」米研究機関、オバマ批判

「중국에 너무 사양해서 오히려 위험 늘어나는」미 연구기관, 센카쿠 자세로 오바마 정권 비판

산케이신문 2월 25일 (월) 7시 55 분배신

　【워싱턴=코우모리 요시히사】미국의 유력 연구기관「허드슨 연구소」는 24일까지, 오키나와현・센카쿠 제도를 둘러싼 일본과 중국의 대립에의 오바마 정권의 자세를, 「적대적 행동으로 긴장을 높이고 있는 것은 중국인데 중국에 너무 사양하는 정책을 취해, 오히려 위험을 늘리고 있는 」라고 비판하는 보고를 발표했다.2기째의 오바마 정권의 외교・안보 포진이 특히 위험하다고 한다.


　보고는「미국은 중국의 일본 위협을 멈추지 않으면 안 되는」와 제목 되어 공화당 부시전 정권의 고관으로 현재는 프린스톤대교수 아론・후리드바그 씨등에 의해 집필되었다.


　보고는, 오바마 정권이 작년부터 아시아 선회(피보또)라고 명명한 중국의 세력 확대에 대한 아시아・태평양에서의 억제력 증강책에 대해서, 최근, 동정권이 중국의 기분을 해치지 않는다고 할 방향으로 연화한 것으로부터, 피보또라고 하는 정책 용어도 회계 용어와 같은「리밸런스(재균형)」로 엷게 할 수 있었다고 지적했다.


　게다가, 아베 신조 수상은 센카쿠 방위에의 미국의 강한 맹세를 요구해 방미했지만, 오바마진`권에서는 종래의 일·미 안보 조약이 센카쿠 제도에 적용된다고 하는 자동적인 언명 이상의 지원은 얻지 못하고, 케리 니이쿠니 츠토무 장관의「아시아의 미군 증강의 필요성에 확신을 가질 수 없는」라고 하는 증언은, 중국에의 후퇴한 자세를 나타냈다고 말했다.


　센카쿠에서의 대립을 둘러싸고, 일본은 중국의 호전성의 표적이며, 중국의 언동이 긴장을 높여 왔다고 지적.2010년의 중국 어선에 의한 센카쿠 제도 주변의 영해 침입을 계기로 한 반일적인 강경 언동이나, 일본측의 센카쿠 국유화를 이유로 하는 반일 파괴 활동, 일본측의 주권이나 시정권에의 하늘과 바다로부터의 침해, 사격 관제용 레이더로의 일본측 함정 포착등을 실례로서 주었다.


　그러나, 보고는, 오바마 정권이 중국측 신지도부와의 대결을 피할 방향으로 자세를 약한, 일중 양국을 동등하게 취급한다고도 생각하게 하는 언동을 하게 되었다고 했다.이러한 정권의 자세는, 센카쿠를 둘러싼 긴장의 원인이 중국 측에 있는 것을 직시 하지 않고, 중국이 일·미 양국간에 쐐기를 박아 넣으려고 일·미 동맹의 힘을 시험하고 있는 현실을 보지 않다고 비판했다.


　보고는, 만약 미국이 일본과의 사이에 거리를 두는 태도를 취하면, 중국의 침략을 격려하는 효과를 불러, 군사 행동을 조장 하면 분진`헤.확실히 미국이 가장 피하고 싶다고 하는 사태를 낳을 지도 모르다고 경고했다.

http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20130225-00000084-san-n_ame





America Must Stop China"s Bullying of Japan

RealClearWorld

February 22, 2013
by Aaron Friedberg , Gabriel Schoenfeld


Is the Obama administration pivoting away from its "pivot"? Today"s visit to Washington by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will begin to provide an answer.

 
The pivot, of course, was the Obama administration"s signature first-term foreign policy initiative. Starting in 2012, in response to signs of increasing Chinese assertiveness, Washington began a series of steps designed to reassure its friends and allies in the region by bolstering the U.S. presence in Asia. The pivot was an appropriate and widely-welcomed response to the growth of Chinese power and the worrisome trends in its behavior. Mr. Abe"s visit provides a highly visible test of the President"s resolve to follow through on his initiative.

 
Over the past several years, Japan has been on the receiving end of much of China"s belligerence. The perpetually insecure Chinese Communist party leadership appears to believe that confrontation with Japan will stir nationalist sentiment, buttressing its public support and its grip on power.

 
To that end, Beijing has:

    escalated a minor incident involving a drunken Chinese fishing boat captain into a major diplomatic crisis;
    blocked exports to Japan of rare earth minerals essential to high-end electronic manufacturing;
    permitted (and perhaps encouraged) violent mass demonstrations that resulted in extensive destruction of Japanese property in China;
    stepped up provocative movements by air and sea around disputed islands controlled by Japan;
    allegedly "painted" Japanese naval vessels with fire-control radar, risking escalation into a shooting war.

 

It is this brinkmanship that has Prime Minister Abe in a state of genuine anxiety about Japan"s security. North Korea"s most recent nuclear test, under indifferent Chinese eyes, has only exacerbated his fears. He is traveling to Washington in search of reassurance.


Unfortunately, there are reasons to fear that he will not find what he is seeking. There are signs that President Obama"s Asia policy could end up more closely resembling a full pirouette than a pivot.


For one thing, there is a new team in Washington. Sec. of State Hillary Clinton and her tough-minded deputy, Kurt Campbell, have departed the scene, as has Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. Sec. of State Kerry and Sec. of Defense (if confirmed) Hagel hold strikingly different views about the exercise of American power.


While the Obama administration, in its first term, stressed the need to strengthen U.S. military capabilities in Asia, Mr. Kerry has already cast doubt on this commitment, declaiming in his confirmation hearings that "I"m not convinced that increased military ramp-up is critical yet" and that we already have "a lot more bases out there [in the Pacific] than any other nation in the world, including China today." In any event, whatever Mr. Kerry intends, and even if sequestration can be avoided, the administration"s planned cuts in defense spending have already called its promises into question.

 
That is the backdrop. On the foreground are some more subtle shifts in the Obama administration"s disposition that have left Tokyo perplexed and dismayed. After talking tough over the last two years, the administration has toned down its rhetoric in ways that have not gone unnoticed in the region. Indeed, the blunt word pivot has been excised from its diplomatic lexicon, replaced by the bland accounting term of "rebalancing."

 
That rhetorical shift is part of a broader effort to reassure the new Communist leadership in Beijing that America"s highest priority is avoiding confrontation. Specifically, on the hottest-button current issue, while the administration has reiterated its position that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are covered under the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty, it has simultaneously displayed nervousness about being forced to take sides in Tokyo"s territorial disputes. Administration officials fended off Mr. Abe"s initial request for a visit to the White House and they have reportedly declined proposals for a joint press conference out of concern for what the Japanese leaders might say in public.



There is no doubt that it would be foolish to get involved in an unnecessary confrontation with China. But is attempting to propitiate China by trying to appear even-handed the best way to reduce the risk of bloodshed, or would we be better off maintaining a posture that is unmistakably strong enough to deter aggressors and reassure friends? The administration appears to be tilting toward the former approach, but the latter is the only reliable pathway to continued peace in Asia.

 
American policy should reflect the fact that Tokyo is not the party primarily responsible for ratcheting up tension in the region. To be sure, there is a nasty streak of Japanese nationalism and politicians, including Mr. Abe, have occasionally flirted with it, to the detriment of Japan"s reputation and position in the world. But it is risible to equate a handful of offensive statements about the past with the virulent and violent strain of nationalism unleashed by the Chinese government.


It is China that has been probing, testing the strength of the alliance, building up its forces, and seeking to drive a wedge between Washington and Tokyo. The paramount danger here is that if we seek to put distance between ourselves and Japan, we will actually encourage more Chinese aggression. And after too much such encouragement, we might well find ourselves forced either to come to Japan"s defense or watch our alliances in Asia crumble. If this happens, the Obama administration will have earned the dubious distinction of accomplishing the very outcome it most seeks to avoid.


Aaron Friedberg teaches politics at Princeton"s Woodrow Wilson School.

Gabriel Schoenfeld is a Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute.

http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=9507